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 Purpose: In Malaysia, since the global financial crisis in 2007 and 
2008, the low level of stability, excessive risk-taking and weak 
governance structure in the dual banking system has become 
essential for deliberation. The purpose of this manuscript is to 
develop a conceptual model on the effect of Shariah governance 
characteristics on risk-taking between local and foreign of Islamic 
banks in Malaysia. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: Based on prior review of 
indicators and findings, this manuscript proposes a conceptual 
model of effective Shariah governance characteristics and its effect 
on risk-taking of Islamic banks. A self-develop of Shariah board 
index (SB-Index) based on SB size, education background, 
membership with IFSB and attendance in meeting. Insolvency risk, 
credit risk and liquidity risk are the proxy used for risk-taking 
measurement. The theory of stewardship and resource dependency 
theory are used as examples of the theories of corporate governance 
to support the conceptual framework suggested.  
Findings: The Islamic banks in Malaysia are assumed to have 
effective Shariah governance and there will be low impact on risk-
taking. 
Implications/Originality/Value: The regulators of Islamic banks 
must prepare for the need to improve the current standards for 
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1.  Introduction 
In banking business, either the conventional or Islamic banks need to make managerial decisions 
involving risk-taking. Corporate risk-taking activities can foster firms’ long-term growth (Faccio, 
Marchica, & Mura, 2011), but excessive risk-taking behaviour can be exacerbate financial stability and 
harmful to firms as well as economic growth of the country. The excessive risk taking behaviour in the 
banking industry is mainly contributed from re-occurrence of financial crisis such as the Asian financial 
crisis in 1998 (Muchhala, 2007) and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 (Paligorova, 2011). A Turkey 
Islamic bank namely Ihlas Finans House, collapsed in 2000/2001 (Ali, 2007) and Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad in Malaysia suffered with great financial loss in 2005. Reasons being, they have poor risk 
management and excessive risk-taking (Ramly, Nurusysyifa, & Mohamad, 2018; Fakhrunnas & Ramly, 
2017). Due to this, the comprehensive monitoring and controlling of financial stability and soundness of 
Islamic banks in Malaysia is very important. 
 
Hence, the Islamic finance environment seems to be dominated by the conventional financial sector, 
with similar risks from Islamic banks and conventional banks. As for example, Khan and Ahmad (2001) 
remarked the inherent risk such as the credit risk of the Islamic banks which adopted interest rate as 
much as KLIBOR among the Malaysian Islamic banks. This situation encourages the Islamic banks 
giving too many loans to less creditworthy borrowers (Mokni, Rajhi, & Rachdi, 2016). In addition, 
liquidity risk, which is another type of risk owned by the Islamic banks, affects the capability of Islamic 
banks to fulfill their liability. Furthermore, Islamic banks are fully exposed to the variety of risk types 
because they are to comply with the Shariah rule. It is imperative to avoid putting in place the core 
concepts of riba, gharar and maysir in the products and services provided (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002).  
 
Replicated from poor conventional banks, the corporate governance could lose confidence of 
stakeholders, and increases the liquidity crisis as well as systemic risk of the country as a whole (Htay & 
Rashid, 2011). Therefore, the effectiveness of internal corporate governance mechanism would assume 
to understand on the risk management by allocating the right people in the right location to gain high 
return (Fakhrunnas & Ramly, 2017). Islamic banks has “additional layer” of corporate governance 
structure known as Shariah Governance (SG) referred to as a system of controlling, guiding and 
directing the Shariah Board (SB). The existence of the structures is to ensure the compatibility with the 
Shariah laws. The challenges of the governance need to be addressed as all the stakeholders including 
investors, regulators and the public placed their interest on the financial stability of Islamic banks system 
(Grassa & Matoussi, 2014). 
 
Malaysian dual banking system has been practiced with co-exist of Islamic banks and the conventional 
banks. As conventional banks demonstrate virtuous standing, Islamic banks are also growing 
tremendously due to the market acceptance and the recognition from majority of Malaysian population 
about religious principles in Islamic banking system (Mirza, Rahat, & Reddy, 2016). While these dual 
banking system encourage competiveness, Islamic banks need to create sophisticated Islamic financial 
products in order to gain more popularity and become customers’ choice in Islamic banking industry 
(Muda, Shaharuddin, & Embaya, 2013). Furthermore, the Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM) has taken 
an incentive by introducing the entry of the foreign Islamic banks with the liberalization of the Islamic 
banking industry since the mid-1990s. The consequence of having foreign banks would help rising the 
capital contribution to the economy as well as the competitiveness of expertise and culture in the 
industry (Ibrahim, Xiang, Nik Azman, & Zulkafli, 2018).  
 
There are still very few studies exploring the influence of Shariah governance on Islamic banks risk-
taking (Alman, 2012; Almutairi & Qutainnah, 2017; Safiullah & Shamsuddin, 2018). Mollah, Hassan, 
Al Farooque, and Mobarek (2017) suggested that, the Islamic banks which offered product complexities 
and transactions mechanisms, the governance structure should permit them to take risks at higher level 
in order to achieve better performance as to be found in the structure of Shariah governance and the 
conventional board (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). Indeed, the formulation of systematic principles of 
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governance is also deliberated to minimize the use of severe and risky financial products. This 
manuscript further explore on the corporate governance theories such as the Stewardship Theory (STD) 
and Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) to describe the impact of Shariah board characteristics on 
Islamic banks risk-taking as discussed by the prior literature (see, for examples; Nomran, Haron, & 
Hassan, 2018; Hakimi, Rachdi, Mokni, & Hssini, 2015). 
 
2.   Bank Governance Theories 
In prior researches, bank governance theories are commonly discussed consisting of agency theory, 
stewardship theory, resource dependency theory, and stakeholder theory. This manuscript focuses solely 
on stewardship theory and resource dependency theory applicable to Islamic banking studies (Bilal 
Saeed & Kashif Saeed, 2018; Nomran, Haron & Hassan, 2018; Nomran, Haron, & Hassan, 2017). The 
stewardship philosophy sees managers as good stewards of the business organization who work 
diligently to achieve a high level of corporate profit and returns for shareholders (Donaldson & Davis, 
1991; Abdullah & Valentine, 2009; Cornforth & Chambers, 2010). Meanwhile, the resource-
dependency theory classifies corporate governance structures as the resources of the organization and 
implies that the resources of the business are the key determinants of its performance (Hillman, 
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000;  Abdullah & Valentine, 2009; Bernadette Josephine & Corina, 2015). 
 
3.   Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
3. 1   Islamic Banks and Risk-Taking  
Due to the complexity of modern financial systems as well as global regulatory patterns, the definition 
of risk taking is difficult to define and even more difficult to measure. In addition, risk-taking in Islamic 
banks is more important and difficult in comparison with traditional banks due to the heterogeneity of 
contractual characteristics (Mudharabah and Musyarakah), general legal requirement (Basah et al., 
2018) and clients ' religious beliefs which can promote greater loyalty and discourage default (Abedifar, 
Ebrahim, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2015). Safiullah and Shamsuddin (2018) stressed that Islamic banks are 
exposed to a higher liquidity risk, lower credit risk, lower insolvency risk, but face similar operating risk 
compared to conventional banks. In this manuscript, the risk-taking is further addressed on the risk of 
insolvency, credit risk and liquidity risk. 
 
3.1.1   Islamic Banks and Insolvency Risk 
The Z-score ratio is widely used to measure banking soundness and financial stability (Čihák & Hesse, 
2010). Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) described bank soundness as the bank's ability to maintain 
hostile insolvency with bank efficiency, major changes in financial banking policy, liberalization of the 
financial sector and natural disaster. The Z-score stated by Laeven and Levine (2007) shows that the 
bank’s valuation of standard deviations suggests a lower profitability of its assets (ROA) than predicted 
and before capital losses. A higher Z-score designates that the bank is very stable. Furthermore, 
insolvency is referred to when losses of banks is greater than the total capital. Therefore, if the bank 
suffered significant losses, the value of the assets will fall below the debts to the sum of depositors. This 
indicates a negative capital status and will expose to a significant problem of withdrawals. 
 
Alharthi (2017) described the quoted Islamic banks as being more stable than the unquoted Islamic 
banks and the banks listed had lower capitals as well. Mokni, Rajhi and Rachdi (2016) empirically found 
that MENA Islamic banks are less stable than conventional banks, and that they also have determinants 
of risk-taking. Abedifar, Molyneux and Tarazi (2013), Chakroun and Gallali (2013), and Čihák and 
Hesse (2010) analysed the risk of insolvency using the Z-score measurement usually found that small 
conventional banks have high default risk compared to small Islamic banks. Čihák and Hesse (2010) 
considered conventional banks to be more robust than the largest Islamic banks, whereas Abedifar, 
Molyneux and Tarazi (2013) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche (2013) found no such 
discrepancy. 
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3.1.2   Islamic Banks and Credit Risk  
The earlier studies in measuring the credit risk, ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) has been commonly 
used in banking studies. The NPL is one of the bank loans that determine whether interest and principal 
payments have been overdue by 90 days or more. Credit risk refers to the probability that failed lender 
will pay the loan as outlined in the contract. Islamic banks may have a different credit risk profile due to 
the different funding methods compared to the conventional banks. Several factors could lead to the high 
credit risk for Islamic banks because of the moral hazard incentives for lenders to share losses with 
banks in its profit and loss sharing (PLS) (El-Hawary, Grais, & Iqbal, 2007). Islamic banks may also be 
exposed to increased credit risk due to religious constraints on the use of conventional credit risk 
management instruments such as credit derivatives (Errico & Farahbaksh, 1998). 
Nevertheless, contract forms between borrowers and banks can minimize credit risk due to knowledge 
asymmetry, which increases adverse selection issues and fosters a better understanding of the 
creditworthiness of borrowers (Errico & Farahbaksh, 1998). Islamic banks may also be less vulnerable 
to credit risk by inducing loyalty and preventing default because of borrowers' religious confidence in 
the Islamic banking system (Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi (2013); (Baele, Farooq, & Ongena, 2014). 
Misman, Bhatti, Lou, Samsudin and Abd Rahman (2015) indicated that any deterioration in the value of 
lending causes banks to make higher provisions for losses, thereby raising the implied level of credit 
risk.  
 
3.1.3 Islamic Banks and Liquidity Risk  
Sulaim and Rashid (2018) defined liquidity risk as when banks incapability to acquire funding from 
short funds deposits in order to finance loans at a longer term. Furthermore, liquidity management 
ensures that there are sufficient cash balances for withdrawals and savings from customers, high assets 
quality and the ability to sustain all expenditures incurred (Olagunju, David & Samuel, 2011). The 
trigger of liquidity risk of banks, however, are misclassified of assets and liabilities in financial reporting 
and broaden loans and credit to high-risk borrowers (Ayunku, 2017). Studies have demonstrated that 
liquidity risk management plays a significant role in Islamic banking. For instance, Safiullah and 
Shamsuddin (2018) used loan-to-deposit ratio as a proxy to measure liquidity risk to identify how banks 
in 28 countries use liquid deposits to fund illiquid loans between Islamic banks. They also described the 
high loan-to-deposit ratio, suggesting greater dependency on non-deposit funds to support lending 
growth and liquidity demand. 
 
Ismal (2010) suggested that the stability of banking institutions would reduce the liquidity problems by 
maintaining a good relationship with relevant stakeholders. It would also successfully handle the 
liquidity demand and supply in line with the bank requirements. Therefore, the incompetence in 
managing the funds or sudden losses of liquidity during volatile economic condition is considered. The 
Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM), issued several guidelines relating to liquidity risk management 
(LRM) namely are: liquidity coverage ratio (BNM/RH/STD 029-9), liquidity framework of conventional 
financial institutions, liquidity framework of Islamic financial institutions (BNM/RH/GL/002-12), risk 
governance (BNM/RH/GL 013-5) and Basel III implementation for liquidity risk management bases. 
 
3.2   Shariah Governance in Malaysia 
Good and dynamic Shariah governance (SG) is very important to the growth of the Islamic banking and 
financial sector in Malaysia. This good Shariah governance has kept Islamic financial growth rapid 
(Hasan, 2010). The stakeholders' interest in good corporate governance will go beyond financial 
interests to social, religious or other principles. The operations of Islamic banks' (IB) are essentially 
based on the principle of profit and loss (risk-sharing) as opposed to interest-driven (riba) activities as in 
conventional banks (CBs) (Mollah & Zaman 2015). 
 
As a result, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) implemented the Shariah Governance Framework (SGF) for 
Islamic Financial Institutions in 2010, and further reinforced the latest implementation in 2013 of the 
Islamic Financial Services Act (IFSA) which makes clear provisions for Shariah governance, something 
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that its predecessor, the Islamic Banking Act of 1993, cannot abide. In general, before SGF (2010) and 
IFSA (2013) were released, most IB voluntarily complies and follows the global standard and 
guidelines, issued by the Islamic Finance Institution (AAOIFI) accounting and auditing organization and 
the Islamic Financial Service Board (IFSB) (Ismail & Hassan, 2016). 
 
Shariah governance may be referred to as the mechanism of governing and guiding the Shariah 
Supervisory Board (SSB) in order to ensure compatibility with the Shariah laws (Grassa 2013). In 
Malaysia, the term Shariah Committee or Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) was used interchangeably 
(Hasan, 2010). The creation of SSB was compelled by IFSA 2013 and SGF 2010. In general, the main 
function of SSB is to advise the board of directors on Shariah matters. It also has to ensure that any 
transaction made, follow the Shariah standards at all times, endorse and check relevant product and 
service records, as well as internal policies, manuals and marketing advertisements (Hasan 2010). 
 
3.2.1   Shariah Board Characteristics and Risk-Taking 
Hassan and Mollah (2014) agreed that the Shariah board (SB) acts as an independent control mechanism 
to prevent the board of directors and other governance agents from engaging in risk-taking practices, 
thereby preventing the IB board structure from taking undue risk during financial turmoil. The SB in the 
IB board structure, however, is morality and ethics-oriented rather than greed; therefore, IB boards 
alleviate shareholder benefits as they do to the detriment of taxpayers or perverse incentives or deposit 
insurance, with the IB board focusing on maintaining social justice. Therefore, during the financial 
turmoil, IB board will take fewer chances and hopefully IB will recover from the financial crisis.  
 
The stronger the Shariah supervisory power of a larger SB is also likely to limit the aggressive financing 
and borrowing activities of a director, which may in effect reduce the risk of Islamic banks. Alman 
(2012) suggested that the decentralized shariah-compliant governance structure, supervisory efficiency 
and disciplining capacity of individual SB banks against risk-taking decreases in Islamic banks’ loan 
portfolio. The SB plays a major role in maintaining good governance of Shariah. Shariah governance, 
namely Shariah committee attributes is affected by the bank profitability, indicating that the higher trust 
of Islamic banks with the Shariah committee members encourages them to be more transparent 
(Masruki, Hanefah & Wahab, 2018). Every factor that drives towards the success of Islamic Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) has their own unique characteristics, and Shariah governance is no exception.  
Furthermore, this manuscript will concentrate on Shariah management structures of Islamic banks, 
which consists of the size, the level of education, IFSB membership and the frequency of scholars 
meetings.  
 
3.2.2   Shariah Board Size and Risk-Taking 
Since the Shariah Board's decision includes understanding Islamic law, modern banking and finance, 
and legal issues, having more SB members with different professional backgrounds will enable legal 
Shariah decision-making and greater compliance with Shariah principles and, as such, will influence risk 
levels in Islamic banks. In addition, it is easy for the management and board of directors to control the 
small size Shariah board whereas it is difficult for them to control a large size Shariah board. The 
minimum number of Shariah boards members is five (5) and there is no maximum number of members 
(BNM, 2013). A study conducted in Malaysia by Othman et al. (2013) shows that most of the Islamic 
Financial Institutions have 5 SB members. 75.3% of the respondents reported they had 5 members, 
16.0% of the respondents had more than 5 members while only 8.6% of the respondents had few 
members with 5. This is a very good indication as about 92.4% of the institutions have achieved the 
required numbers of the SB required numbers of the members. 
 
The resource dependence theory also implies that larger boards possess a range of expertise and 
experience and are therefore able to offer higher quality guidance and advice to companies (Dalton, 
Daily, Johnson & Ellstrand, 1999). The resource-dependence theory (RDT) suggested that a larger SB 
could also influence the boards' ability to improve credit quality, policies, and strategies ex-ante Shariah 
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screening and minimize the moral hazard of managers by implementing less rigorous borrowers' 
business monitoring. Also, a larger SB with a stronger Shariah oversight capability would likely restrict 
the aggressive financing and lending activities of a manager, which could in effect minimize the risks of 
Islamic banks. From the viewpoint of stewardship theory, the board’s size defines the board’s ability to 
monitor and advise management. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) indicated that in large and complex 
businesses, which are more diverse and require more professional guidance, a larger board size would be 
more effective. 
 
The empirical evidence from a research on SB by Fakhrunnas and Ramly (2017) and the risk-taking 
conduct of Islamic Bank in South East Asia, which was observed over six cycles between 2009 and 
2014, found that SB had a negative impact on it. A study by Almutairi and Quttainah in 2017 found that 
IBs with larger SB has increased in the organizational risk where the SB size coefficient is economically 
positive and significant, which means that one-unit increase in SB size is associated with an increase in 
bank risk of 0.4 per cents. Alman (2012) revealed that the risk-taking borrowing portfolio of Islamic 
banks is positively influenced by the rising size of the SB in 82 Islamic banks from 13 countries in the 
Middle East, North Africa and South East Asia. They concluded that the board size is correlated with 
issues of free-riding and longer decision-making durations. Safiullah and Shamsuddin (2018) found that 
an increase in the size of the SB would reduce the risk of insolvency of Islamic banks and create 
liquidity risk that is negligible.  
 
3.2.3   Shariah Board Education and Risk-Taking 
A relevant prior literature suggested that the capability of directors in board would increase through a 
high academic qualification for the purpose of interpretation and evaluation of information (Bantel, 
1993), to join-part of complex problems with a variety of proposed solutions (Bantel & Jackson, 1989) 
and to involve an in-depth assessment on implication on decision makings (Chen, 2014). Berger, Kick 
and Schaeck (2012) suggested that the cognitive abilities of the board of directors would increase their 
effectiveness in decision-making through the advanced academic qualifications (e.g. PhD degrees) and a 
strong guide monitoring of risk-taking behaviours. 
 
With a suitable commitment package, a committed and trained boards, will protect the banking industry 
from overall credibility risks and through active supervision that is recognized which can evaluate 
Shariah compliance. Shariah boards’ expertise and experience are the key element in judging and 
promoting Islamic banking Shariah compliant growth (SGF, 2010; IFSA, 2013). Without this growth, 
the risk can affect the shareholders short-term profits or benefits by inducing the board of directors to 
agree to compromise with Shariah principles. The involvement of Shariah literacy managers will prevent 
the primacy of profit motivation over compliance with Shariah. The licensing stage is particularly 
important from the regulatory point of view, whereby the licensing authority will request a clear 
demonstration of the commitment of sponsors to Islamic banking. 
 
The members of the SB with advanced academic qualifications will improve their efficiency to 
formulate Islamic values in banking practices, including the introduction of an unreasonable moral risk 
prohibition (Ramly, Nurusysyifa & Mohamad (2018). Suppose that, advanced academic qualifications 
may help SB members accurately assess the risk consequences of Shariah-compliant banking and 
provide guidelines for developing internal risk hedging techniques. Almutairi and Qutainnah (2017) 
argued that the probability of bank risk increased when the SB is highly educated. Conversely, Safiullah 
and Shamsuddin (2018) found that the percentage of SB members with advanced academic 
qualifications would lower the insolvency risk of Islamic banks. 
 
3.2.4   Shariah Board Membership and Risk-Taking 
Conflicts may arise from the Shariah context and understanding differences (i.e., Hanafi, Hanbali, 
Maliki, and Shafi'i), and these conflicts that promote different perceptions of Islamic bank inefficiency. 
The formation of the International Financial Services Board (IFSB) was therefore a step towards 
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integration of the interpretations of Shariah law and religious rulings. In addition, the contradictory in 
fatwas will generate opposition and misinterpretation among the customers, employees, managers and 
directors of Islamic banks. Nevertheless, by implementing IFSB subscribers among Islamic banks, the 
fatwas can be consolidated, and these can boost banks’ SB quality and soundness, as well as the 
organizational behavior and effectiveness. 
 
The foundations of the Islamic Financial Institutions Accounting and Auditing Organization (AAOIFI) 
and IFSB will standardize the system of Islamic financial contracts and transactions and improve the 
systems of trade and governance. Empirical evidence from Almutairi and Qutainnah (2017) showed that 
SB is relevant with membership of IFSB and has a positive impact on bank risk. The emergence number 
of Islamic banks’ individual SBs (approx. 80 percent of the total sample) is mostly members of at least 
one of those two global SBs that immediately liaise with these standard-setting Islamic organizations.  
 
3.2.5   Shariah Board Meeting and Risk-Taking 
Board meeting has significant relevant in corporate governance and the abnormal board meeting 
influenced the firm value (Vafeas, 1999). He further argued that the frequency of board meetings may be 
high due to the complexity and growth opportunities. Since Islamic banks involve in a variety of product 
transactions with Shariah law obligations, Muneeza and Hassan (2014) recommended that the SB should 
conduct meetings at least once a month and the attendance of all the SB members are made compulsory. 
These periodical meetings between SB, the board of directors and management board of banks may 
request consultations pertaining to Shariah issues. In Malaysia, the meetings of Shariah board shall be 
held in every two (2) months in every financial year. Each banks are also required to disclose the 
number of meetings attended by the SB scholars in the annual financial statement (BNM, 2009). 
 
3.2.6   Shariah Board Index 
Verriest, Ann and Daniel (2013) believed that the measurement of governance quality is more accurate 
by having aggregated indices than single indicators. Hence, in this manuscript, the measurement of 
Shariah governance characteristics and effectiveness using self-developed Shariah board index are 
aggregated by four (4) variables: SB size, SB level of education, SB IFSB membership and SB meeting 
frequency. The SB-Index is constructed based on Ajili and Bouri (2018), Mathew, Ibrahim, and 
Archbold (2017), SGF (2010) and IFSA (2013). Each variables included in the index are generated by 
giving the value of 1 when the value of the variable is either above or below the median and otherwise 0. 
 
Based on the argument above, the proposed hypothesis of this manuscript would state as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
Shariah board characteristics have significant negative relationship with risk-taking between the local 
and foreign Islamic banks in Malaysia. 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
Shariah board characteristics have significant negative relationship with insolvency risk between the 
local and foreign Islamic banks in Malaysia. 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
Shariah board characteristics have significant negative relationship with credit risk between the local 
and foreign Islamic banks in Malaysia. 
 
Hypothesis 4: 
Shariah board characteristics have significant negative relationship with liquidity risk between the local 
and foreign Islamic banks in Malaysia. 
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4.   The Proposed Conceptual Model 
Figure 1 displays the proposed conceptual model of the research. This model is constructed from in-
depth prior literature research that concentrated on the characteristics of Shariah board including the 
number of scholars in Shariah board, percentage level of education who obtained PhD among the 
Shariah board, the scholars of IFSB member and the frequency of Shariah board meetings being held in 
every financial year ended. The self-developed of Shariah board index (SB-Index) was constructed from 
these four (4) Shariah board’ attributes. The effect of Shariah board through SB-Index on risk-taking is 
tested by examining the aggregate of the risks: insolvency, credit and liquidity and individual risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The proposed conceptual model on the effect of Shariah board characteristics on risk-taking of 
local and foreign Islamic banks in Malaysia. 
 
5.   Potential Contributions and Conclusion 
The establishment of sound governance standards is often intentional to decrease the dynamic banking 
industries used in the unequal and risky financial products. Nevertheless, there are scant studies 
available to examine the impact of Shariah governance on Islamic banks’ risk taking (Alman, 2012; 
Almutairi & Qutainnah, 2017; Safiullah & Shamsuddin, 2018). In addition, Mollah, Hassan, Al 
Farooque, and Mobarek (2017) indicated that similarities in Islamic banks and conventional banks' 
governance structure enabled both banks to take risks at a higher level in order to achieve better 
performance (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). Therefore, the current research is an attempt to fill the gap in 
Shariah governance studies as many areas have not been discovered in such analysis, especially on the 
effect of high education of scholars and the frequency meetings of the Shariah board on risk-taking 
Islamic banks. 
 
This manuscript has important policy consequences for the reform of the current advisory and 
supervisory system for regional banking regulators and the global regulatory standard-setting bodies of 
Islamic banks (e.g. AAOIFI, IFSB, and BNM). For example, if the central bank restructures the lending 
facilities of Islamic subsidiaries of conventional banks, Islamic banks will have a better position to 
mitigate their liquidity risk. In addition, customary limits on Islamic fixed income (sukuk) markets need 
to be levied by regulatory bodies. 
 
The findings on the impact of the Shariah board’s characteristics on Islamic banks 'risk-taking also have 
consequences for reforming and reconstructing the Islamic banks' governance structure. This ‘additional 
layer’ structure of bank governance with a broad Shariah board that is over-represented by highly 
educated scholars, technically acquired with qualified membership, and high frequency of Shariah board 
meetings will make bank risk reduction more successful. 
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